We proposed a quantum bit commitment protocol, in which entangled states and quantum algorithms is used. The bit is not encoded with the form of the quantum states, and delaying the measurement is allowed. Therefore the protocol will not be denied by the Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go theorem, and unconditional security is achieved.
the protocol can all be calculated from the non-entangled states. Therefore the calculation involved is not thoroughly a quantum algorithm. As we know, entangled quantum states have the power to carry out parallel computations, which is much more powerful than classical algorithm. Therefore it is not surprise to see that by making full use of the entangled states, Alice can execute the protocol successfully even she delays her measurement, just as if she is executing the commitment with b = 0 and b = 1 simultaneously. Then in the unveil phase, she can apply local transformation on the first register to alter the state between |0 and |1 . This is the reason why Alice can cheat in these protocols [15, 16, 25] .
So we can see that, to propose a secure QBC protocol that can stand this so-called Mayers attack, we must make full use of the computation power of the entangled states. The effect of the entanglement must be taken into consideration throughout the commitment, thus quantum algorithms must be involved. So the outline of our new protocol goes as: In the commit phase, Alice and Bob first share some certain entangled states which can solve a certain problem with quantum algorithm; Then Alice shows Bob that she has indeed solved the problem. Solving the problem should be able to force Alice to measure a minimum set of states even with the most efficient quantum algorithm, while the other states can be left unmeasured. Then we correlate the commit bit b with the states according to whether the states is measured or not. In the unveil phase, Alice should show Bob that there is a certain number of states which are indeed unmeasured. A state which is already measured and collapsed can not be used to fake a state which is still entangled with another state. Therefore the security of the commitment can be guaranteed.
For concreteness, in the following we shall use four quantum states of photon with different polarizations in the description. But in fact the protocol can be constructed on any other type of nonorthogonal states as well. Here we denote the four states of light polarization of angles 0
• , 45
• , 90
• and 135
• as |0, 0 , |1, 0 , |0, 1 and |1, 1 respectively. We will also consider the ideal setting only, where the quantum communication channel is supposed to be error-free. Before we get to the protocol, let us first consider the following problem:
Problem P: Alice and Bob execute the following procedure: (1) Alice sends Bob a series of quantum states {|β i |i ∈ S} where S ≡ {1, ..., s} is a set of natural numbers;
Bob randomly picks a bit p 
This problem can easily be solved by the following "semi-classical" method. Alice can determines all the s quantum states beforehand, i.e. in step (1) she prepares every state |β i in a non-entangled pure state |p i , q i β . Then she sets D = {i ∈ S| |p But with full quantum algorithm we can solve the problem more efficiently. Alice can prepare every state |β i as a mixture entangled with another system |α i . For example, in step (1) she can prepare the state of the whole incremental system as |ψ i = |α i ⊗ |β i = cos θ i |x α ⊗ |0, q i β + sin θ i |y α ⊗ |1, q i β , where |x α and |y α are orthogonal to each other, q i ∈ {0, 1} and θ i ∈ (0, π/2). She sends |β i to Bob, and after step (3) she divides S into two subsets: M = {i ∈ S|q ′′ i = q i } and U = {i ∈ S|q ′′ i = q i }. Due to the specific form of |ψ i , Bob is more likely to find |β i as q i than q i no matter which basis he uses. Therefore when Alice finds Bob announcing q ′′ i = q i , she knows that he is more likely to be lying. So for the states whose indices are included in U, she can just leave them unmeasured. And for ∀i ∈ M, She measures |α i in the basis (|x α , |y α ). She sets p i = 0 if she finds |x α or p i = 1 if she finds |y α . Then she sets In the "semi-classical" method described above, Alice's action in step (1) is equivalent to preparing the states in an entangled form as well at first , but then measures all the s entangled states |ψ i to make |β i collapse into non-entangled pure states before Bob measure them. So we can see now with the full use of the computational power of the entangled states, Alice manages to measure less states than the "semi-classical" method while the same goal is achieved.
This quantum algorithm is already the most efficient one. One can verify that preparing |ψ i in other forms will have to measure more states when detecting D. For example, if Alice prepares |ψ i = |α i ⊗ |β i = cos θ i |x α ⊗ |0, 0 β + sin θ i |y α ⊗ |0, 1 β and always measures |α i in the basis which can force |β i to collapse to p ′′ i , she will need to measure s/2 states to detect D. Or if she prepares |ψ i = |α i ⊗ |β i = cos θ i |x α ⊗ |0, 0 β + sin θ i |y α ⊗ |1, 1 β and always measures those that satisfy |p 
and randomly divides S ≡ {1, ..., s} into two subsets S ′ and S ′′ such that
and f b > f c ) and announces to Alice the "fake" results {|p Unlike those described in Problem P, in step (C2) we allow Bob to choose a subset S ′ , and delay the measurement on |β i (∀i ∈ S ′ ). For the states in this set, since Bob has to announce |p ′ properly, Bob can still control the total lying frequencies f a , f b and f c , as those described in step (C3). The purpose of S ′ is to enhance Bob's chance on catching Alice cheating in steps (C5) and (U3). However, the protocol is still valid even if Bob chooses S ′ = φ. The purpose of step (U3) is to make sure that Alice does not shift the bits in string c 0 from 1 to 0. In another word, it is to check whether Alice has already measured a state |α i to make |β i collapse, but still tries to say that the two states are left entangled. There are many type of measurement that Bob can perform to catch this kind of cheating. When both the two registers |α i and |β i in |ψ i are not measured before (i.e. i ∈ U ∩ S ′ ), Bob can simply measure the amount of entanglement [26] between them. Since local transformations will not affect the entanglement, Alice can not make a measured |α i entangle with |β i without the help from Bob. So if the result of Bob's measurement turns out to be zero or much different from the expected value calculated from the form of |ψ i Alice announced, Bob should reject this commitment.
For the other states where one of the registers of |ψ i is already measured in the commit phase, Bob can use the form of |ψ i Alice announced to calculate the expected state |e i to which the other register of |ψ i should collapse. Then he measures this register in the basis (|e i , |e i ⊥ ). As we know, different measured results of one of the registers will cause the other register to collapse to different states, and these states are not orthogonal to each other when θ i = 0 ∧ θ i = π/2. Therefore if Alice has not followed the protocol honestly, the unmeasured register will have a non-zero probability to be found as |e i ⊥ by Bob. For instance, suppose Alice has formerly prepared a state as
Alice will then include the index i 0 of this state in set M and measures |α i 0 in the basis (|x α , |y α ). Suppose that she obtain |x α in her measurement. So she will not include i 0 in set D. Now since i 0 ∈ M − D, she should set c 0 i 0 = 1. However, the dishonest Alice wants Bob to believe c 0 i 0 = 0, so she must send Bob a fake state |α i 0 . But she does not know the result of Bob's measurement on |β i 0 . Since she has found |α i 0 as |x α in her measurement, there are three possibilities: Bob has found |β i 0 as |0, 0 β , |1, 0 β , or |1, 1 β . Then |α i 0 has collapsed to 2/3 |x α + 1/3 |y α , 1/3 |x α + 2/3 |y α , or |x α respectively. If she prepares |α i 0 = |x α and sends to Bob, chances are that Bob has formerly obtained p
= |0, 0 β in step (C2) so he is expecting |α i 0 = 2/3 |x α + 1/3 |y α . Then when he measures |α i 0 in the basis ( 2/3 |x α + 1/3 |y α , − 1/3 |x α + 2/3 |y α ), he stands 1/3 chances to finds |α i 0 as − 1/3 |x α + 2/3 |y α and catches Alice cheating. In this case, the probability for Alice to cheat successfully for this single bit is f = 2/3. As the minimum distance between codewords is d, to keep the total number of 0 in c 0 unchanged, a dishonest Alice will have to shift at least d/2 bits of c 0 from 1 to 0 to fulfill her cheating.
Therefore the total probability for Alice to successfully cheat this way without being caught is less than max(f ) d/2 . Since d/n is fixed to be a constant in the protocol and n ∝ s, this probability drops exponentially to zero as the security parameter s increases.
The purpose of step (U4) is to make sure that Alice does not shift the bits in string c 0 from 0 to 1. In our protocol, although Alice can shift a bit c 0 i from 0 into 1 simply by measuring |α i , the total number of 1 in c 0 is already restrained to be about |M − D| ∼ (1 − f b + f c )s/4. Since |M| is already the minimum of the number of states that Alice has to measure to solve Problem P, if she shift more bits from 0 into 1, there will be too much 1 in c 0 . So this kind of cheating is easy for Bob to find out. Also, solving Problem P with |ψ i = |α i ⊗ |β i = cos θ i |x α ⊗ |0, q i β + sin θ i |y α ⊗ |1, q i β has a characteristic property: all lie b among the set of states that Alice measured will be detected. This is because when |β i is found as |0, q i β (or |1, q i β ) in Bob's measurement, |α i will collapse to |y α (or |x α respectively). If Bob applies lie b by announcing it as |1, q i β (or |0, q i β ), Alice is then expecting to find |α i as |x α (or |y α ) in her measurement. Since |x α and |y α are orthogonal to each other, so when Alice measures the states that satisfy q ′′ i = q i only, lie b will be 100% detected and none of them will be left in set M − D. Thus if Bob finds (M − D) ∩ L b = φ in step (U4), he knows that Alice must have measured some states which do not satisfy q ′′ i = q i , or even has not prepared |ψ i in the correct form. Therefore if Alice alters much of the bits in c 0 , she will inevitably be caught. Nevertheless, due to the fluctuation of random distribution, we can not expect the size of D detected by Alice to be exactly equal to (f a /2 + f b /4 + f c /4)s. So if Alice alters only few bits of c 0 , she may escape from being caught. But the codeword method in the BCJL protocol can avoid this situation. That is, since the minimum distance between any legal codewords is d, altering only a small number of bits of c 0 will not enough to change a codeword into another legal codeword. Therefore this way of cheating will make no sense to Alice at all. Now we will show that the protocol is also secure against Bob. During the commit phase, since q i is kept secret by Alice, Bob can not know how to divide S into subsets M and U. Though he knows that in the n-bit string c 
Divide by 2 n−k (the number of syndromes of the code C), and we get: the number of codewords at Hamming distance d 0 has a lower bound 2 k−n/2 / √ n, which is exponentially large in n as long as we choose k/n > 1/2 in step (C7.1). Therefore Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6 of Ref. [17] are also valid for our protocol. That is, Bob has exponentially small amount of Shannon information on the value of b before the unveil phase.
So we can see that our protocol is both unconditionally binding and concealing, therefore it is unconditionally secure. In this protocol, whether a bit takes the value 0 or 1 does not depend on the form of the corresponding quantum state, but on whether the state is measured by Alice or not. Delaying the measurement is not forbidden in our protocol, on the contrary, it becomes a must. Since the number of the states which are not measured by Alice is restricted to reach a certain quantity, and Alice can not use measured states to fake unmeasured ones, the Mayers attack (or the EPR attack) in MLC-theorem does not succeed any more. Unlike previous QBC protocols, using non-entangled pure states is no longer valid now even for the honest participants. To execute our protocol, the participants must have the techniques to prepare and store entangled states. Though these techniques may still be a challenge in the present, they are just the tools that make previous QBC protocols fail. So when these techniques become available, only the QBC protocols which make the full use out of them can remain secure.
Thus by using entangled states to run quantum algorithms, we propose an unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment protocol. Therefore all the other cryptographies that base on bit commitment, such as unconditionally secure quantum oblivious transfer, two-party secure computations, quantum coin tossing and quantum oblivious mutual identification are then straight forward. The potential of quantum cryptography meets a great development.
